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Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: Lawyer
Responsibility for Collective Misconduct
William H. Simon

t

Deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity are key recurring themes
in modern scandalsfrom Watergate to Enron. Actors, especially lawyers, seek
to limit responsibility by avoiding knowledge and clear articulation. This
essay considers this phenomenon from the point of view of both business
organization and legal doctrine. Evasive ignorance and ambiguity seem
endemic to a particularorganizationalmodel and to a traditional model of
legal responsibility.Developments in both law and business, however, suggest
that these models are being superceded. Many of the most dynamic businesses
now emphasize practices of "transparency" designed to inhibit evasive
ignorance and ambiguity. A major trend in recent legal doctrine, exemplified
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, is to strengthen duties of inquiry and clear
articulation. The legal profession, however, has strongly resisted these trends
with respect to its own regulation. This essay argues that the bar's opposition
to many of the lawyer regulation initiatives under Sarbanes-Oxley reflects a
misguided attachment to the privileges of non-accountability associated with
deliberate ignorance and calculatedambiguity.
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Introduction
A distinctive set of ethical and regulatory issues arises when harmful
conduct is ambiguous or the actors profess ignorance of its effects. Such
ambiguity or ignorance sometimes indicates inadvertence and blamelessness.
But because both law and social opinion hesitate to condemn ambiguous or
ignorant conduct, actors are tempted to affect calculated ambiguity or deliberate
ignorance in order to diminish accountability.
We are familiar with these practices from literature and history.
Shakespeare illustrates deliberate ignorance in Antony and Cleopatra. When
Menas asks Pompey for permission to kill Pompey's rivals for the chief
magistracy of Rome, Pompey reproaches him:
A!, this thou should'st have done,
And not have spoken on't....
... [B]eing done unknown,
I should have found it afterwards well done,
But must condemn it now.'

Henry It employed calculated ambiguity when he cried out, "[W]ill no
one rid me of this turbulent priest?" simultaneously prompting his knights to
murder Thomas Becket and permitting Henry to deny that he intended such an
2
extreme response.
Issues of ignorance and ambiguity are prominent in some recent financial
scandals, notably Enron. Some of the most important provisions of the Enroninspired Sarbanes-Oxley Act on corporate governance address such issues.
Sarbanes-Oxley is the culmination of an important trend toward norms that
narrow the range for excuses based on ignorance and ambiguity by encouraging
or requiring inquiry and articulation. Traditional ethics and liability norms left
a broad range for such excuses, but the traditional approaches seem increasingly
anachronistic, especially as applied to organized political and business conduct.

I

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA act 2, sc. 7.
2
StMON ScHAmA, A HISTORY OF BRITAIN: AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD? 3500 B.C. - 1603
A.D., at 141-42 (2000). 1 quote the language of legend. Schama says that Henry actually said
something closer to, "[w]hat miserable drones and traitors have I nourished and brought up in my
household who allow their lord to be treated with such shameful contempt by a low-born cleric!" Id. at
142.

Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity
Most significantly, business management styles have evolved during the
past three decades to emphasize broad inquiry and clear articulation and to
condemn ignorance and ambiguity as symptoms, not only of potential public
irresponsibility, but also of poor business performance. Regulatory efforts that
seek to enhance accountability by encouraging inquiry and articulation resonate
with these business developments.
Nevertheless, these regulatory trends have not been uniformly welcomed
by those subject to them, and there has been one pocket of especially fierce and
successful resistance-the legal profession. The profession's reaction to the
regulation of lawyers mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley shows a reluctance to accept
the kind of accountability the statute promotes and an apparent attachment to
the privileges of ignorance and ambiguity.
Part I of this essay further illustrates deliberate ignorance and calculated
ambiguity by recalling that they were emblematic of the wrongdoing in
Watergate and then exploring their role in two major episodes of lawyer
conduct in Enron.
The next two parts consider the relation between these pathologies and
organizational style and structure. Part II reviews some accounts of modem
corporate life that suggest that deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity are
encouraged by a particular model of organization I call ambivalent bureaucracy.
Enron was an example of ambivalent bureaucracy, and the key weaknesses of
this form of organization seem to have played a major role in its collapse. Part
II surveys recent trends that may be eroding the prevalence of the ambivalent
bureaucracy and promoting types of transparency and accountability which
constrain ignorance and ambiguity.
Part IV reviews a trend in legal regulation that parallels the evolution of
business style and structure toward transparency and accountability. This trend
has strengthened and elaborated duties of inquiry and articulation. SarbanesOxley stands as a striking confirmation of the trend.
Finally, Part V shows that, compared to business managers and
accountants, the legal profession remains an outlier in both the virulence and
the success of its resistance to transparency efforts. Nevertheless, some aspects
of the recent regulatory initiatives of the Securities and Exchange Commission
have the potential to push the bar along the path its corporate clients are
traveling.
I.

Ignorance and Ambiguity in Watergate and Enron

The behavior that offends us in public scandals is sometimes blatantly
illegal. On the other hand, it sometimes takes the form of socially obnoxious
but inadvertently unregulated behavior, such as the exploitation of loopholes.
Deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity are recurring behaviors that cut
across both categories. They are efforts to escape accountability either to the law
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or to social opinion for consequences that the actor should know are socially
harmful. Such efforts were among the most salient and unattractive features of
the wrongdoing in Watergate, and in more diluted form, they seem central to
questions of lawyer conduct in Enron.
A.

Watergate

The most salient theme in the unsavory moral world of the Watergate
participants is not amorality or ruthlessness, but rather aversion to
accountability. The participants showed intense faith in the immunizing power
of deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity.
When Hugh Sloan, treasurer of the Committee to Re-Elect the President
("CREEP"), asked campaign finance chairman Maurice Stans why Gordon
Liddy had asked for $83,000, Stans replied "I do not want to know and you do
not want to know ..... 3 (Liddy was planning the burglary of the Democratic
National Committee headquarters.) When Liddy's accomplice Howard Hunt
phoned presidential advisor Chuck Colson after the burglary, Colson
"repeatedly insisted that he knew nothing about Watergate and wanted to keep
it that way. ' 4 At about the same time, Liddy approached Attorney General
Richard Kleindienst on a golf course and said, "'you've got to get my men out
of jail."' Kleindienst said, "'You get the hell out of here kid. Whatever you
have to say, just say [it] to someone else.' 5 When asked much later about
charges that the Greek military dictatorship made secret contributions to
Watergate-related activities, CIA Director Richard Helms replied, "Even if
somebody suggests they would like to do it, I would insist that they don't tell
me about it because that is dynamite."6
Ambiguity is an equally salient theme in Watergate discourse. In his
introduction to the tapes, R. W. Apple wrote, "[t]he record is ... so full of
ambiguities and contradictions and elliptical language-a kind of White House
code-that definitive judgments will be difficult." 7 Some of the ambiguity may
have been inadvertent or unconscious, reflecting mere anxiety or indecision. In
the very long discussion between Nixon and Dean about payment of hush
money to the burglars, Nixon veered back and forth between approval and
disapproval of the payments, leaving no impression of how he thought he had
left the matter.8
However, the Watergate participants themselves often emphasized the fact
that ambiguity can be used deliberately to minimize accountability. Did

STANLEY t. KUTLER,
3
(1990) [hereinafter WARS].
4 Id. at 249.

5
6
7
8

THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON 355

THE WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPTS 142 (Gerald Gold ed., 1974) [hereinafter TRANSCRIPTS]KUTLER, supra note 3, at 206.
TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 5, at 4.
See id. at 132-80.
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CREEP Chairman John Mitchell authorize the Watergate break-in? Nixon
doubted that he would have done so in any way for which he could be held
accountable: "Hell, [Mitchell] ... may have said, don't tell me about it, but
' 9
you go ahead and do what you want. But that doesn't take the rap you know.
Did Chief of Staff Bob Haldeman? John Dean had a similar doubt: "I think he
knew there was a capacity to do this but he was not given specific direction. ' °
What about Colson? Dean reports that, when Liddy and Hunt came to Colson
to complain that CREEP chair Jeb Magruder was reluctant to approve their
efforts, Colson called Magruder and said, "You all either fish or cut bait. This
is absurd to have these guys over there and not using them. ' ' 11 Dean assumed
that Colson expected Magruder to interpret this as endorsement of Liddy's and
Hunt's burglary plan, but he also expected that Colson would deny it and
"would probably get away with denying it. ' ' 2
B.

DeliberateIgnorance in Enron: The Vinson & Elkins Letter

After CEO Kenneth Lay received Sherron Watkins's August 15, 2001,
letter suggesting improper accounting and self-dealing, Enron's general counsel
asked its principal outside counsel, Vinson & Elkins ("V & E"), to
V & E had played a major role in some of the relevant
investigate.
transactions; it therefore had a conflict of interest and should not have
undertaken the assignment." For whatever reason, the investigation the firm
conducted was notably circumscribed. As a board committee formed after the
collapse concluded, "[t]he result of the V & E review was largely
predetermined by the scope and nature of the investigation and process
employed."' 5 V & E's circumscription was especially notable in two broad
areas.
First, the lawyers decided that they would not reconsider, or "second
guess," Arthur Andersen's accounting judgments, nor would they seek

9

ABuSE OF POWER: THE NEW NIXON TAPES 55 (Stanley Kutler ed., 1997).

TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 5, at 140.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 137.
Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, app. C, at 166-69, In re Enron
(Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.
2003), http://www.enron.com/corp/por/
(AJG)
Corp.,
No. 01-16034
examinerfinal.html [hereinafter Final Report].
14
See Roger Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical
Issues, 58 Bus. LAW. 143, 163-67 (2002). Watkins in her letter had presciently warned Lay that Enron
"can't use V & E due to conflict-" Destruction of Enron-RelatedDocuments by Andersen Personnel,
Hearing Before the House Subcomm, on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 107th Cong. 43 (2002) [hereinafter Hearing].
15
Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors
of Enron Corp. 176 (Feb. 1, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter Investigation]. This document is
also commonly known as the Powers report, after committee chairman William C. Powers, Jr.
10
11
12
13
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independent accounting advice.' 6 In effect, the lawyers acted as if the Andersen
accountants had sole responsibility for accounting judgments and that their own
responsibilities were limited to assuring that material facts were presented to
the accountants. This limitation was remarkable for at least two reasons.
One reason was that, under the relevant accounting standard, the most
important determinant of accounting treatment was the extent to which Enron
had retained control of rights and financial interests in the partnerships' assets.7
This was, as the accounting standard explicitly recognized, a legal question.
Moreover, V & E had already given quite a bit of advice and assistance in
matters related to these issues. According to the board committee report,
"Management and the Board relied heavily on the perceived approval by V &
E of the structure and disclosure of the transactions."' 8 Vinson & Elkins had
given legal opinions in connection with similar transactions for the purposes of
supporting the accounting treatment Enron sought.' 9 And it had given advice
with respect to whether some of the transactions required elaboration in the
"Management Discussion and Analysis" section of Enron's securities filings.20
• A further problem with V & E's deference to the accountants is that V &
E's letter shows that its lawyers understood the accounting concerns raised by
Watkins and later vindicated by the Powers report and many other critics. In a
concluding section entitled "Potential Bad Cosmetics," it noted key objections
to the accounting treatment, including the arguable facts that the special
purpose entities were not truly independent and that they were insolvent,
implying that their obligations to Enron appearing on its books were
valueless. 2 The letter suggested that disclosure of further information might
lead to lawsuits or bad publicity. The letter implies that, as long as the
accountants "were comfortable" with these matters, such concerns were a matter
of prudence within the discretion of the board, rather than of legal duty.

16
Letter from Max Hendrick III, Vinson & Elkins LLP, to James Derrick, Executive Vice
President and General Counsel, Enron Corp., Oct. 15, 2001, reprinted in Hearing,supra note 14, at 47,
51.
17
FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
NO. 125: ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICES OF FINANCIAL ASSETS, AND EXTINGUISHMENTS
OF LIABILITIES (June 1996), para. 23 (explaining that proper treatment depends on specified "factors
pertinent under applicable law.") A revised standard governed the later Enron transactions, but the
basic determinants were unchanged. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 140: ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS

AND EXTINGUISHMENT OF LIABILITIES (Sept. 2000).
18
Investigation, supra note 15, at 26. The fullest account of the lawyers' activity is in Final
Report, supra note 13.
19
V & E declined to give an opinion with respect to whether the special purpose entity
transactions were "true sales," which was the legal issue central to accounting treatment. It gave "true
issuance" opinions with respect to some of the transactions. These opinions were technically correct,
but they did not support Andersen's accounting treatment. It appears that Vinson & Elkins gave the
opinions knowing that Enron and the accountants wanted them for the purpose of supporting their
preferred treatment. Id. at 28-48.
20
Id. at 48-52, 86-90.
21
Hearing,supra note 14, at 53.
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But securities laws do not recognize any distinction between information
that merely "looks" bad and information that really bears on performance. The
issue under these laws is whether information is the type that a "reasonable
investor" would be influenced by. A reasonable investor cares about information
that would be likely to cause price movements.22 Thus, one might argue that
"Bad Cosmetics" was by definition a violation of the materiality standard
under the securities law. At the least, this was a legal question a business
lawyer should have considered. Yet V & E failed to do so.
V & E's self-imposed ignorance extended to another area of concern:
allegations of improper self-dealing. With regard to these issues, the Powers
Committee faulted the lawyers for speaking only to ten mostly senior people at
Enron and Andersen. These individuals, "with few exceptions, had substantial
professional and personal stakes in the matters under review. ' 23 The Committee
suggested that more junior employees or former employees might have
provided more disinterested information.24
Although the report does not charge V & E with it, another striking
omission appears there. Just as V & E considered approval of financial
statements by the accountants conclusive and sought only to ascertain if the
accountants were aware of the facts, so they took approval of the LJM
transactions by the board as conclusive and sought only to ascertain compliance
with approval processes. At the times it approved the LJM structures, the
Board recognized the deals would require a waiver of Enron's ethics code and it
conditioned the waiver on review and approval of each deal by the chief
accounting and risk officers and an annual review of completed deals by the
Board's audit, finance, and compensation committees. 25 The chief accounting
and risk officers were both subordinate to CFO Andy Fastow, the key LJM
stakeholder, so their approval could not have been expected to be a strong
check. The Audit Committee review was thus of central importance. In its
letter, V & E concluded that "it appears" that the mandated review had
occurred at the end of the two annual periods since the LJMs were
established.26

22
See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (holding that the
standard is satisfied when "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider information important in deciding how to vote"); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)
(holding that investors can be assumed to rely on soundness of public market prices). There may be a
paradox here because the principle implies that a reasonable investor would be interested in matters of
concern tounreasonable investors to the extent that the decisions of the latter affected prices. But the
securities laws seem comfortable with this position.
Although sparse and dated, the relevant authority indicated that compliance with Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles would not exonerate an otherwise misleading statement. See United
States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805-07 (2d Cir. 1969); THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF REGULATION
610-11 (4th ed. 2002).
23
Investigation, supra note 15,at 177.
24
Id. at 176-77.
Id. at 150-65.
25
26
Hearing,supra note 14, at 50.
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In fact, the Powers report found that Board committee review was cursory
and based on mistaken assumptions. The Board vastly overestimated the
degree of scrutiny that the chief accounting and risk officers were giving to the
27
deals and wrongly thought that CEO Jeffrey Skilling was approving them.
Important information on the substance of the transactions was withheld from
the Board. Most importantly, the annual reviews of LJM transactions by the
Audit and Compliance Committee (and later also the Finance Committee)
appear to have involved only brief presentations by management (with
Andersen present at the Audit Committee) and did not involve any meaningful
examination of the nature or terms of the transactions. Moreover, even though
mandated procedures required a review by the Compensation Committee of
Fastow's compensation from the partnerships, neither the Board nor senior
management asked Fastow for the amount of his LJM-related compensation
until October 2001, after media reports focused on Fastow's role in LJM.28
V & E's failure to recognize the weakness of the Board's review seems to
arise from a decision to assess the Board's efforts on the basis of documents. V
& E decided not to interview Board members on the extent of their efforts or
understanding. (After V & E concluded its report, it gave a verbal summary of
its conclusions to the Audit Committee, but this meeting seems to have
involved re-assurance, rather than probing. 9)
V & E's failure to interview Board members responsible for reviewing the
transactions surely rivals the firm's more prominently condemned
misjudgments. Given the pervasiveness of managerial conflicts, Board
committee review was a critical safeguard, and the Board itself seemed to have
deemed it so at the time it authorized dealings with the partnerships. It was not
plausible to think that the quality of this review could be assessed on the basis
of documentary records.
No doubt lawyers do not casually seek to interview members of the Board
of a major corporate client, but V & E itself recognized that the stakes in this
matter were extraordinarily high. It should have recognized that the Board's
role was critical. Thus, the question arises whether its efforts might have been
inhibited by a desire to avoid receiving or giving information. Perhaps Lay or
the lawyers themselves did not want to take the risk of learning that the
Board's consideration had been inadequate, since such knowledge might have
intensified their own responsibilities. Perhaps the lawyers sensed that, if the
Board knew little about the transactions, it was because its members preferred it
that way. Perhaps they did not want to take the risk of burdening them with
unwanted knowledge.

27
28
29

Investigation, supra note 15, at 148-78.
Id. at 11.
Final Report, supra note 13, at 176-77.
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C.

CalculatedAmbiguity in Enron: The Temple Memo

On October 12, 2001, knowing that an SEC investigation of the Enron
audits was likely in the near future, Nancy Temple sent an e-mail to Michael
Odom. The text read:
Mike It might be useful to consider reminding the engagement team of our
documentation and retention policy. It will be helpful to make sure that we
have complied with the policy. Let me know if you have any questions.
Nancy
It concluded with the URL of the Andersen policy on its web site.3"
Temple was a lawyer in the legal office of Andersen's Chicago
headquarters. Odom was director of Andersen's Houston office. Odom promptly
forwarded the message to David Duncan, Andersen's "engagement partner" on
the Enron account. A few days later Duncan organized the shredding of more
3,500 pounds of Enron-related documents. Duncan subsequently pleaded guilty
to obstruction of justice in connection with the shredding, and he testified at
Andersen's criminal trial that his decision to shred had been influenced by the
Temple memo."
Temple denies that her memo was calculated to encourage destruction.
She testified to a Congressional panel that she intended simply that Odom and
Duncan follow the policy. According to her, it was Duncan's responsibility as
engagement partner,32 to interpret the policy and to make inquiries if he had any
difficulty doing so.
Temple's account was incredible as a description either of the relative
responsibilities of lawyer and client in this situation or of Temple's motives.
Lawyers are trained and paid to be advisors, not archivists. Their job is to tell
clients what the rules require them to do, not simply to pass them along.
Moreover, the Andersen policy was, as the firm itself later conceded, "not a
model of clarity."33 It was 10 pages long, turgidly written, and ambiguous in
key respects. It stated that audit work papers should be preserved for six years
and that "[in case of threatened litigation, no related information will be
destroyed."
On the other hand, it also stated that "drafts and preliminary
versions of information should be destroyed," that personnel should "eliminate
or destroy [client information] when no longer needed," and that "only
essential information to support our conclusions should be retained.''M It did

30
Hearing,supra note 14, at 45.
31
See Jonathan Weil & Alexei Barrionuevo, In the Balance: As TrialNears End, Andersen
Proves Surprisingly Tough, WALL ST. J, June 4, 2002, at Al.
32
See Hearing,supra note 14, at 118-68 (recounting Temple's congressional testimony).
33
Id- at 35 (recounting the Prepared Statement of C.E. Andrews, Global Managing Partner
of Arthur Andersen).
34
Id. at 79-105.
35
Id.
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not specify the priority of these competing injunctions. 36 Thus, it was at least
risky to leave interpretation to a lay person. And what was almost certainly the
most prudent advice for a lawyer to give on October 12-preserve all Enronrelated materials until further notice-was not very difficult to formulate.
There are two possible interpretations of the ambiguity of Temple's
memo. Many believe that she intended to tacitly encourage destruction of
Enron documents.37 There is much to be said for this interpretation. Andersen
had suffered large losses in several recent lawsuits, and an attitude of bitterness
and wariness toward litigation appears to have been pervasive. Odom had
explicitly urged destruction of documents in anticipation of litigation a couple
of days before 38Temple wrote (although there is no indication that Temple was
aware of this).
But another equally plausible interpretation is that Temple was uncertain
about aspects of the policy or about what advice she should give. Temple's
testimony to Congress suggested that she was not sure even by that point what
Andersen's duties were.
A simple warning not to destroy Enron-related
documents might prompt detailed inquiries about specific documents that
would have been difficult to answer. Moreover, Temple might have worried
that even clear and accurate advice would have been unwelcome. Such advice
sometimes limits the recipient's later ability to claim excusable mistake.
Regardless of which interpretation we accept, there remains the further
question of why Andersen's policy was itself ambiguous. Casual or amateurish
drafting is certainly one explanation. On the other hand, bad litigation
experiences had led Andersen to focus on the document retention issue and
might have been expected to induce careful thinking about the matter. A more
likely explanation lies in the tensions inherent in document destruction strategy
generally. These tensions create strong pressures against clarity.
The drafter of a corporate policy faces the following problem: after she has
specified which documents the company is legally obliged to retain-for
example, documents likely be sought in imminent litigation-she needs to
indicate which of the remaining documents should be retained and which
should be destroyed. In principle, she would like to retain helpful documents

36

Id.

37

See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKINS, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE

AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 382 (2003); see also Weil & Barrionuevo, supra
note 31, at Al (reporting prosecutor's suggestion that Temple intended to tacitly encourage the

destruction of memos).
38
See Weil & Barrionuevo, supra note 31, at A 1.
39
Temple professed uncertainty under questioning from Representative Markey:
REP. MARKEY: Is it your legal opinion that Andersen is free to shred documents relating to its
work for Enron until such time as it actually receives a subpoena from the SEC or formally
named as a defendant in a class action lawsuit by Enron's employees or other investors?
Ms. TEMPLE: I have not reached that legal opinion.
REtP. MARKEY: What was your view at the time?
MS. TEMPLE: I was not asked ... to reach a legal opinion at any particular time ....
Hearing,supra note 14, at 150.
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and destroy harmful ones. But it is impossible to fully anticipate in advance
which documents will fall into these categories or to effectively express her
expectations in precise rules. Thus, she is pushed to leave discretion for ad hoc
decision-making under an open-ended standard that prescribes destruction when
the document is likely to be harmful. Ad hoc decision-making, however, has
especially severe disadvantages in this context. For one thing, it means that
local decision-makers will have to make difficult judgments for which they will
not always be qualified. For another, evidence law provides that, when a party
has destroyed documents pertinent to a claim, the trier may infer that the
4
Ad hoc
documents would have supported the adverse party's position.
decisions under a harmfulness standard are more likely to encourage such
inferences, since such decisions will suggest that the decisionmaker specifically
determined that the document was harmful.
In this situation, the policy-maker may be inclined to employ ambiguity
for two distinct reasons that parallel the interpretations of the Temple memo.
First, an ambiguous policy might seem likely to produce the most litigation
advantage. It leaves discretion to local decisionmakers. If they understand
tacitly that the goal is to eliminate harmful material, they will exercise their
discretion accordingly, but the absence of an explicit standard will make it
easier to portray the destruction as motivated by something other than a sense
of culpability.
Second, an ambiguous policy might seem to allow the policymaker to
avoid sticking her neck out in a situation where there are large risks. A clear
rule-based policy runs large risks of over-inclusion (documents that turn out to
be desperately needed get destroyed) or under-inclusion (documents that turn
out to be smoking guns are preserved). A clear standards-based policy risks
embarrassing and adverse inferences from destruction. A policymaker might fear
that, should some extreme version of these bad outcomes occur, hindsight bias
or opportunism might cause others to blame her. An ambiguous policy has the
same risks, but it has the compensating advantage that it increases the policy
maker's chance to claim that she did not intend or foresee the bad consequence
and to blame the local decisionmakers for it.
D. Liability
Clearly in Watergate and apparently in Enron, key participants sought
immunity through ignorance and ambiguity. In Watergate, they were largely
unsuccessful. The two Enron episodes described here have not been fully
resolved, but the participants have already suffered reputational damage and face
civil and criminal liability.

40

See 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 291 (James Chadboum ed., 1979).
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In the Andersen criminal prosecution, the government argued that
Temple's letter was intended to encourage document destruction and hence was
an act of obstruction of justice. Although some jurors may have agreed, the jury
as a whole did not. Its conviction was based on another episode involving Ms.
Temple. It still remains possible, however, that Temple will face individual
criminal charges. It is also arguable that her advice, if not obstruction of justice,
was malpractice. Such a claim seems unlikely as a practical matter, but in
different circumstances, she might have been faced with a negligence claim from
the client (or its successor).
The pending civil damage action against Vinson & Elkins alleges that the
letter to Derrick amounted to fraud, as an effort to cover-up the deceptions in the
42
original transactions.
The bankruptcy examiner suggested that evidence
concerning the firm's conduct of the Watkins investigation would support a
malpractice claim.43
Thus, in both Watergate and Enron, it is not clear that the pre-existing
liability rules failed to adequately address the conduct in question.
Nevertheless, a natural response has been to tighten prohibitions and increase
sanctions. As with Watergate, another response has been exhortation against
the misconduct. To the extent that misconduct is not a matter simply of
rational calculation but of acculturated instinct, exhortation may be responsive.
Thus, it is pertinent to consider the relative influences of strategy and culture.
II.

Organizational Pressures: Ambivalent Bureaucracy

Many accounts of the structure of business organization take notice of
deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity and attribute these phenomena to
distinctive organizational pressures. In some accounts, these pressures are
endemic to a style and structure of business organization that was dominant
until recently and was evident in Enron and Arthur Andersen.
Ambivalent bureaucracy is my term for the most salient model in the
academic literature on American business organization of the last century. This
model asserts that there is a strong and inevitable gulf in large organizations
between two regimes of order-a formal one and an informal one. The formal
one is a bureaucracy of the sort described by Max Weber-a hierarchical
organization of narrowly specialized roles governed by rules. The behavior of
rank-and-file agents is controlled through rules promulgated by top managers.
The informal order is made up of tacit norms and personal relationships. The
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informal order arises because the formal one is insufficient. A major problem is
that the top managers lack information about the production process necessary
to promulgate and update rules of adequate specificity for rank-and-file agents,
and they lack the information
about the behavior of the agents needed to
S 44
monitor their compliance. How the informal rules respond to these
deficiencies varies among accounts, but many suggest an important role for
deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity. In particular, they suggest both a
cultural account and a strategic account of these phenomena.
A.

Culture

By some accounts, the informal order of the ambivalently bureaucratic
business organization is characterized by hierarchical networks of personal
deference and loyalty. A participant's most fundamental obligation is to serve
his immediate superior, and this means not necessarily complying with the
organization's express rules or even the superior's express commands, but
instead catering to her unspoken desires.45 These relations are fluid because
people typically move from job to job within them. The identity of one's
superiors changes over time. Thus, one has to be fairly adept at shifting
allegiances and at reading the unspoken concerns of different people.
Ignorance and ambiguity have important uses in such a culture. A
participant needs to avoid certain types of knowledge because it triggers
responsibilities under the explicit rules that would conflict with the unspoken
desires of a superior. Knowledge of wrongdoing by the superior or knowledge
that might reflect adversely on the superior that would trigger reporting
obligations are the most serious examples. Information about risks and
uncertainties where it appears that there is little that can be done may be
another. Just as the participant avoids knowledge that is unhelpful to her, so
she also refrains from transmitting information to the superior that the superior
does not want to hear, information that would trigger unwelcome duties or
induce anxieties on the part of the superior.
In these accounts, managers would prefer not to take responsibility for
decisions involving risk or uncertainty. They tend to tacitly delegate such
matters downward, forcing subordinates to resolve them without explicit
guidance. Subordinates perceive that managers do not want information that
would force them to confront such matters directly.
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In addition,

most bosses simply do not want to hear bad news. Bad news either requires
action, always open to multiple and perhaps pejorative interpretations, or it
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upsets pre-established plans of action, scattering ducks already set in a row.
Besides one can only criticize something when one has the resources to
solve it in a clear and decisive way. Otherwise,
one should keep one's
' 47
skepticism to oneself and get "on board.
Ambiguity is a critical tool of flexibility. The participant wants to keep
his commitments tacit so he can modify and shift them as circumstances and
relationships change. He prefers to speak imprecisely and off-the-record so as
not to limit his freedom to re-characterize his commitments in retrospect and or
to change them prospectively.4 "Within the corporation, subordinates often
have to protect their bosses 'deniability' by concealing the specific dimensions
of a problem in abstract, emwty terms, thus maximizing the number of possible
subsequent interpretations."
There are a variety of functional explanations for this culture. It makes
possible a limited kind of mutual recognition and support where deeper kinds
are not possible. It allays the anxiety that is naturally associated with
uncertainty. Its practices strike individuals as strategies for material success.
However, part of what we mean in calling this explanation cultural is that
people engage in these practices more or less unreflectively. They may initially
adopt and periodically re-aflirm the practices on instrumental grounds-as
means to material reward-but the practices do not remain a matter of ongoing
calculation. Often the practices become habitual and persist even after the
environmental contingencies that made them strategically plausible have
changed. If the culture fails to adapt to such change, the practices become
dysfunctional. Thus, on this cultural view, it is no surprise that people
sometimes behave in ways that depart from rational assessment of their material
interests. Either they have sacrificed these interests to the emotional needs
served by the practices, or the culture has blinded them to the environmental
changes that have decreased the strategic effectiveness of the practices.
Although Watergate took place in the context of a political organization
rather than a business one, this cultural interpretation fits it quite well. Personal
loyalty is clearly the most basic norm for the Watergate participants. The tapes
show Nixon's preoccupation with retaliation against those who are disloyal to
him. The participants repeatedly conflate virtue with sensitivity and
commitment to the needs of Nixon and his close advisors. They describe their
goal as the protection of "the Presidency," but they conflate the interests of the
institution with those of its incumbent. The idea that exposure of White House
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wrongdoing might hurt only Nixon, and not his office, invariably eludes
them. 0
The tapes also illustrate the fluidity of this ethos. As the collaborators
perceive that some will have to be sacrificed, and as some defect and oftr
testimony against the White House, loyalties shift drastically. Former team
players become casualties or traitors, who no longer show or can expect
loyalty."
We don't know enough about Enron and Arthur Andersen to assess the
pertinence of this cultural explanation, but there are some indications that it
may prove helpful. In contrast to the strategic explanation we consider next,
cultural explanations have some ability to account for behavior that seems
against the actor's self-interest. At least some of the conduct in Enron seems of
this kind. In particular, Nancy Temple's conduct is hard to account for in
rational strategic terms. She knew that inquiry was likely and that her e-mail
advice would almost certainly be discovered in the event the inquiry became at
all extensive. It seems very doubtful that whatever personal stake she might
have thought she was protecting by sending the e-mail could have been of a
magnitude to warrant the risk she ran. Thus, in our present state of knowledge,
it seems plausible to see this as the kind of unreflective, self-protective
ambiguity encouraged by the corporate culture of amoral personal loyalty.
B.

Strategy

Criminal or tort liability for intentional wrongdoing typically requires
proof of an element of conduct and an element of intent. In the organizational
context, the conduct is often a statement. In the case of fraud, a false statement
constitutes an act. In the case of other wrongs, a statement instructing or
authorizing a subordinate to engage in some further wrongful act constitutes an
act. Intent is often inferred from knowledge. With fraud, if the person knows
facts that make the statement fraudulent, the intent to deceive can be inferred.
With acts committed by subordinates, intent can be inferred from knowledge of
facts that make it likely that the subordinate will respond to the statement by
doing the wrongful act.
In the organizational context, a perennial strategy of those in control for
avoiding this type of liability is to encourage subordinates to engage in
wrongful conduct only indirectly or ambiguously and to avoid receiving
information about it. The controllers can do this by structuring the organization
in a way that creates tacit pressures for such behavior. The key elements of such
a strategy are decentralization coupled with selective incentives. The
subordinate receives rewards or penalties based on evidence of a narrow range of
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performance-for example, sales volume or profits-but has wide discretion
with respect to other aspects of his performance. Discretion does not have to be
explicit. It can arise from the silence of the organization's rules or from their
selective enforcement. Thus, the controllers can promulgate rules forbidding
illegal conduct-say, bribery or pollution-but tacitly nullify the rules by
failing to monitor compliance or to sanction violations.
A liability regime predicated on evidence of direct knowledge and explicit
encouragement will have difficulty imposing sanctions against the organization
as a whole or the controllers in such a situation. In fact, the conduct and
knowledge requirements for civil and criminal liability in American law have
not been so strict as to preclude liability in this situation. Nevertheless,
managers can sometimes reduce their risk of individual liability by a strategy of
tacit encouragement and enforced ignorance (though, as we will shortly
52
acknowledge, the potential gain has been considerably eroded in recent years).
Of course, in this scenario, the subordinates will be fully chargeable with
knowledge and explicit misconduct. The implicit bargain between them and
the controllers will be plausible only if the latter anticipate compensation for
the greater risks they assume. However, the fact that they are likely to be poor
relative to the controllers facilitates agreement. The relative poverty of the
subordinates means, first, that they have less wealth to lose in the event of
failure, and perhaps second, that the marginal value of prospective material gain
is higher to them (that is, they will demand less compensation than the more
wealthy controllers for running a given amount of risk).
The relatively low status of the Watergate burglars and of John Dean, the
White House lawyer who negotiated for their silence, seems consistent with
this strategy. Their low status seems to have made them attractive both because
it facilitated denial of knowledge by their superiors and because it was likely to
motivate them to take the necessary risks. 53 Of course, Watergate also
illustrates the central weakness of the strategy: since the controllers, in order to
preserve their claim of ignorance and non-authorization must limit monitoring,
they run an increased risk that the subordinates will perform incompetently or
take excessive risks.
Some elements of corporate scandals also resonate with this perspective.
In his 1977 survey of the subject, Jack Coffee looked at the spate of then recent
scandals involving illegal payments to foreign government officials and an
earlier group involving price fixing. 54 Among the recurring characteristics he
found are those associated with our strategy. The active wrongdoers were
generally middle or lower-level managers. Corporate policies were either silent
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about the practices or they were unenforced. Monitoring was lax, and there were
sometimes informal sanctions for reporting lower-level misconduct outside the
chain of command. The actors were compensated or evaluated on the basis of
indicators such as sales or profits that would be moved in their favor by the
practices.
At Enron, we find a chief financial officer, Fastow, who was given
extraordinary discretion and high-powered incentives contingent on a fairly
narrow set of indicators coupled with disinclination on the part of his superiors
to monitor him. Given the subordinate's incentives and the corporate stakes,
these developments would seem amazing from any perspective other than the
one we are considering.
Andersen also seems to have had a remarkable degree of decentralization.
Duncan and his engagement team in Houston were bound to Enron by a strong
incentive compensation scheme. It appears that central oversight at Andersen
was so weak that when an internal audit partner from Chicago headquarters
warned of problems with the Enron accounting, the Houston team was able to
have him removed.55 Furthermore, Andersen had no procedures for centrally
It left
monitoring its auditors' compliance with its
56 document retention policies.
such matters up to the engagement partner.
Moreover, the effort by Enron's senior executives and Vinson & Elkins to
shift ostensible responsibility for the critical accounting judgments to Andersen
seems consistent with the pattern. As we have seen, the key judgments
involved legal matters that the lawyers should have been competent to assess.
Among the executives and professionals involved, the accountants were the
least compensated, least prestigious, and least credentialed. 7 On any
functional view, assigning them responsibility to unilaterally make the most
difficult reporting judgments would make little sense. Their relative poverty,
however, made them best qualified to run the risks of public sanction for
misconduct.
C.

Cultureand Strategy: ProfessionalDuty to Organizations

Problems of ambiguity and ignorance take on a different cast in the context
of the dealings between professionals and their clients. Both as a matter of tort
liability and as a matter of professional discipline, lawyers owe their clients
duties of care and loyalty. These duties impose affirmative burdens both to
communicate clearly to the client and to acquire information. Unlike the
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situation with arm's length dealings, the lawyer cannot satisfy these duties by
remaining silent. She generally cannot blame the client for the client's
predictable misunderstanding of the lawyer's literally accurate but knowingly
misleading statement. And she must undertake reasonable research to develop
information needed to make her advice effective.
Clearly these doctrines are intended to obviate the problems of ambiguity
and ignorance. Nevertheless, when the client is an organization, ambiguity
recurs from a diflerent angle. The problem now arises from the difficulty of
identifying the client. An organization is an abstraction; lawyers can deal with
organizations only through their individual constituents. They need norms to
tell them how to identify from among the various actors who purport to speak
for the corporation those on whom they should bestow the care and loyalty due
a client.
This is not the place for a full account of these issues," but we can readily
note the most salient ambiguity in the bar's response. On the one hand,
lawyers tend to identify the organizational client with the managers with whom
they deal personally. This tendency resonates strongly with both the cultural
and strategic considerations we considered above. Lawyers take the same
psychological satisfactions in personal loyalty and deference as business
executives. And lawyers have a clear strategic interest in pleasing the executives
with whom they deal, since these executives will most likely make decisions
about the lawyers' future retention. As a matter of substantive law, this
tendency seems justifiable in the most common situations where managers
purport to speak for the organization and there is no reason to doubt their

authority.
But identifying the organization with its managers is not appropriate
where managers are violating the corporation's own norms or knowingly
harming the interests of its constituents. In such situations the tendency of
recent doctrine is to point to the board. The board has broad strategic and
oversight responsibility for the enterprise. Thus, when managers are acting ultra
vires, the lawyer can serve the organizational client by going to the board.
However, as a practical matter, this course is often costly to the lawyer,
especially where she has no strong prior relation with the board. The lawyer
who goes over the head of the misbehaving manager is likely to ruin her
relation with the manager and risk her future employment prospects with the
firm. The latter risk seems particularly severe if we recall the lesson of
organizational scholarship that the board may not be grateful for the lawyer's
intervention. 59 Informing the board may trigger responsibilities that the board
might prefer not to have.
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In addition, we need to consider the situation where the board knows of
the wrongdoing and, whether because of incompetence or complicity,
acquiesces in or encourages it. At this point, it becomes implausible, as a
matter of principle, to identify the client with its board. On the other hand, as a
practical matter, the alternatives-going to constituents (shareholders) or an
agency charged with protecting them, such as the SEC-seem awkward and
radical. In a private corporation, shareholders might be contacted discreetly, but
in a public corporation, communicating with shareholders would involve
public disclosure.
Surely there are situations where such public disclosure is the best way for
the lawyer to protect the interests of the organizational client, but lawyers are
deeply uncomfortable with such a course. As a cultural matter, lawyers are so
viscerally habituated to thinking of clients in terms of personal relations and to
thinking of confidentiality as the core ethical obligation that it is hard for them
to appreciate that loyalty to the client might require going public. As a
strategic matter, going public will antagonize anyone in the organization with
any power to allocate legal business and will send a signal to managers of other
enterprises who might employ the lawyer that they cannot count on the
lawyer's loyalty to them individually.
So the issues of organizational loyalty are difficult as matters of principle,
culture, and strategy. On the one hand, it is untenable to assert that the
organizational lawyer should always serve management. On the other hand,
duties to go beyond management require difficult judgments and involve
personal costs for the lawyer. In this situation, the bar's response has been to
acknowledge the principle that the organization to which lawyers owe loyalty is
something different fron its managers, but to keep ambiguous the scope of duty
to constituents other than managers.
We see this preference for ambiguity in the bar's principal response to
these issues: Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13, first promulgated
in 1983.60 Prior to this rule, although lawyers had always represented
organizations and public corporate work had been a major component of the law
practice for a century, there was virtually no doctrine at all on the distinctive
duties of counsel to an organization. In terms of clarifying a lawyer's duty, the
Model Rule was not much of an improvement. It started by asserting plausibly
that the lawyer represents the organization "acting through its duly authorized
agents," but then it meandered into evasiveness when it came to the critical
situations in which agents are acting ultra vires. In cases of wrongdoing, it
prescribed, superfluously, that the lawyer act "in the best interests of the
organization," indicating that this "may" involve going to the "highest
authority that can act on behalf of the organization." It provided no guidance as
to when the lawyer should climb the ladder. The "highest authority" was
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undefined, so it was unclear whether it might ever include shareholders. The
rule could be interpreted to forbid reporting wrongdoing outside the
organization, but it was ambiguous on this point as well.
For twenty years, there was virtually no official effort to clarify these
ambiguities. The ABA amended the rule in August 2003 only after Congress
and the SEC had intervened with the attorney conduct provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and implementing regulations. 6 ' And its revisions were the
minimum (or perhaps less than the minimum 62) needed to avoid pre-emption
by the Sarbanes-Oxley rules. Like Sarbanes-Oxley, the new rule makes going
up-the-ladder to the "highest authority" mandatory in certain circumstances,
and it permits outside disclosure of wrongdoing to prevent future harm to the
corporation. But all the ambiguities that had not been independently clarified
by Sarbanes-Oxley were retained. The "highest authority" remains undefined.
The lawyer's responsibilities with respect to past wrongdoing are unspecified.
There is still no indication as to how the lawyer is to exercise her discretion to
disclose to avoid future harm.
III. The Changing Influence of Corporate Structure: Self-Conscious
Bureaucracy
In his 1977 article on corporate wrongdoing, John Coffee took account of
the observations of organization theory about the limited information and
control of senior managers over corporate agents and the consequent strategic
and cultural effects inhibiting compliance with public norms. He argued,
further, that the problems of limited information and control inherent in any
large bureaucratic structure were intensified by the multidivisional form that the
large corporation assumed during the first half of the twentieth century.
In this structure, the corporation's activities were divided into product
groups, each housed in a separate division with operating autonomy. Division
managers controlled operations. Central managers, including the Board, were
responsible for strategy. They monitored the performance of the divisions and
sanctioned or rewarded them, in particular, by allocating capital toward or away
from them. This structure further distanced senior managers from front-line
operations. By causing them to specialize in financial monitoring across a
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broad range of products, it reduced the importance of expertise in and
knowledge of operations. At the same time, it intensified the conflict of interest
between lower and upper management
by drawing a clear line between central
63
and divisional management.
Coffee's response to the problems of managerial ambiguity and ignorance
was to modify this structure to introduce bridges between central and divisional
management. Thus, he proposed "mini-boards"--divisional committees
composed of central board members and operating managers that reported to the
board and transmitted its policies..
In the years since Coffee's analysis, however, both the self-image and the
structure of American business organizations have changed. Developments have
altered the features he saw as reinforcing pressures toward ambiguity and
ignorance and created countervailing pressures toward inquiry and articulation.
The change seems to have been prompted by intensified product competition
and by advances in communications and information technology. Product
competition has required firms' operations to become more flexible and
dynamic. Technology has facilitated new forms of decentralization. Both as a
norm and a description, ambivalent bureaucracy has been64 challenged by a new
model, which might be called self-conscious bureaucracy.
To begin with, the multidivisional firm is no longer in fashion. Neither is
the preeminence of finance over operations. Firms are encouraged to focus on
"core competences," and senior managers are expected to act less like bankers,
and more like entrepreneurs. There is a tendency for hierarchy to be compressed
and for lines of authority to cross horizontally. Product development and
production occur by shifting collaborations across specialties both within the
firm, and as firms outsource more and collaborate more intensely with their
suppliers and customers, across firms. In such circumstances, coordination is
achieved less by command-and-control authority structures and more by
"shared vision."
Firms that have gone furthest along these lines see
themselves as "learning organizations" engaged in continuous innovation.
Senior managers in such organizations should take a "systems approach."
This means they are alert to the myriad shifting influences on and elements of
the firm's activities. New information technologies facilitate the collection,
retrieval, and analysis of a far broader range of data than previously. Data
recorded by lower-tier workers can be accessed and analyzed instantly by people
physically and organizationally remote from these workers.
In this new context, personal relations of deference and loyalties
independent of the firm's articulated goals are more difficult to maintain.
Relationships now shift so rapidly that they do not have time to gel even
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provisionally. In any given collaboration, it is likely to be more difficult to
determine who is senior to whom. Moreover, key monitoring and even
evaluation functions are more likely to be performed by people who have no
strong personal contact with the person monitored or evaluated. And
monitoring is likely to be at once more pervasive and more intensive.
Some of the strongest pressures of this organizational approach are toward
articulation and inquiry.
A.

Articulation

Clear and explicit policy becomes important in these circumstances for
many reasons. "Say what you do, and do what you say" is a basic maxim. 61
Pervasive documentation of policy and practice is prescribed in order to obviate
the ambiguity and inconsistency of oral communication. Part of the idea is to
eliminate dependence on informal relations. "The objective is to make the
operational process substantially independent of individuals, so that any
appropriately experienced and trained individual could make the system
work.

66

In the self-conscious bureaucracy, policy, rather than being promulgated
from above or evolving informally, is negotiated explicitly at many levels. In
the absence of stable linear authority, people find more need of explicit policy
for guidance. Communication across positions, disciplines, and firms puts a
premium on explication. People have to be prepared to work with others they
have never met before and who do not share a common educational background
or professional orientation. They cannot appeal to the body of tacit
understanding and commitments that members of the same profession might
share. 67 Thus, they must be explicit to be understood.
In addition, forcing people to state their premises explicitly is a basic
heuristic strategy of the "learning organization." It forces people to examine and
to expose to criticism by others assumptions they might otherwise have taken
for granted. Moreover, explicit description of practices facilitates learning across
positions and firms. People look for "best practices" developed by leading
performers in the field, but these practices can only be adopted by outsiders if
they have been intelligibly described.
Evasion of issues or risk and uncertainty is viewed as pathological. "Risk
management" is a key function in the self-conscious bureaucracy. Managers are
65
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expected to identify risks, formulate strategies for limiting them, and update the
strategies in the light of experience.6
B.

Inquiry

In the ambivalent bureaucracy, the key formal function of management is
to issue policy. Monitoring sometimes comes as an afterthought. The formal
model of the organization encourages a naYve tendency to see policy as selfimplementing and hence monitoring as superfluous. To the extent that the
practical reality of the corporation takes the form of informal hierarchies of
personal deference and loyalty, monitoring is difficult because informal practices
are opaque to the monitors. In the new style, the commitment to "say what
you do and do what you say" mitigates these problems.
Moreover, in the new organization, monitoring is critical, not merely as a
means to insure compliance with settled policy, but as part of the process of
continuous reassessment and revision. The new organizational style collapses
the distinction between policy-making and monitoring. Implementation of
policy generates experience and information that can be used to improve it.
Senior managers have to stay in touch with rank-and-file actors (and involve
them in the process of revision) in order to capture the benefits of these lessons.
Policy tends to take a different form in the new style. Formal policy in the
ambivalent bureaucracy is characteristically binary; it specifies thresholds that
must be met unconditionally, and when met, constitute unconditional
compliance. Rules of this kind continue to play a role in the new style, but
they co-exist with different kinds of norms implied by the ideal of continuous
improvement: moving targets and scaled measurements. The policies specify
targets and require actors to demonstrate progress toward them. The targets are
revised as progress is made. Satisfactory progress is often measured by
comparison to the performance of comparable plants or firms. This latter type of
norm requires senior managers to take a greater interest in monitoring.
Performance under such norms cannot be meaningfully summarized by a
conclusory judgment of compliance. It is critical to know where on the scale
the actors are performing.
Finally, monitoring tends to be very broad in the new style of
organization. The strategy of deliberate selective ignorance, in which senior
managers watch matters such as sales and revenues that are important to them
but overlook performance with respect to matters of public interest, is not a real
option for these organizations. This is partly a function of changes in legal rules
we shall shortly consider. For corporations sensitive to adverse publicity, it is
a function of public relations. But more fundamentally, it arises from the fact
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that management cannot reliably determine which aspects of the corporation's
performance are irrelevant even to its narrow selfish goals.69
In a dynamic business environment, the critical indicators of effective
performance are not stable. In choosing strategic ignorance, management takes
risks that the information it dispenses with will turn out to be important to its
goals. If, for example, management cannot tell whether high sales figures reflect
bribery of purchasing agents or customer satisfaction with its product, it cuts
itself off from important product development information. If it cannot tell
whether the lower costs of a particular plan represent more efficient processes or
more lax compliance with environmental norms, it impairs its ability to make
key investment decisions. In a more stable business environment, the strategic
benefits of such ignorance might have been worth the price, but the premise of
the new industrial organization is that organizations can no longer afford it.
The self-conscious bureaucracy model remains so far simply a tendency in
some quarters of business, and it may not be plausible for some fields of
enterprise. Although Enron portrayed itself as an embodiment of the most
progressive and innovative tendencies in business organization, it more
strongly resembled older models in its visceral and strategic tolerance of
ignorance and ambiguity.'
IV. The Trend Toward Legal Duties of Inquiry and Articulation
The trend in business practices toward transparency has been paralleled
and reinforced by contemporaneous legal developments that have prescribed
duties of inquiry and articulation.
A.

Duties ofInquiry

In 1963, the Delaware Supreme Court held in Graham v. Allis Chalmers
that directors had no duty to initiate monitoring or compliance procedures in

69
The pressures to monitor in the new model are countered by liability concerns. A harsh
and erratic liability system will make even law-abiding firms hesitate to make their operations
transparent. These counter-pressures can be reduced by reforms that mitigate liability when the
defendant makes monitoring and disclosure efforts. See Jennifer Arten & Reinier Kraakman,
Controlling CorporateMisconduct: An Analysis of CorporateLiability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687
(1997).
70
In a pioneering article Robert Eli Rosen portrays Enron as an example of the "redesigned
corporation," his name for what I call self-conscious bureaucracy. See Robert E. Rosen, Risk
Management and Corporate Governance: The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1157 (2003).
Although I learned a lot from it, I think he is wrong to associate Enron with the new model. He treats
decentralization as a novel feature of the new model, when in fact, the literature cited in notes 35 and
36 above shows that it was also a central, albeit tacit, feature of the old one. Second, he
underestimates the importance in the new model of the features of transparency that Enron so
strikingly lacked.

Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity

the absence of specific evidence of managerial wrongdoing. The case arose out
of price fixing in violation of the antitrust laws. The corporation had been held
liable in public and private enforcement actions, and shareholders brought a
derivative suit against directors seeking reimbursement for the corporation's
loss. For decades, the case stood for a basically reactive conception of directors'
duties which did not require alfirmative efforts to elicit information.
In 1996, Delaware Chancellor William Allen suggested in a widely noted
opinion that, although never explicitly repudiated, the Allis-Chalmers case was

no longer good law. He argued that directors'

duties embraced some

responsibility to determine "that the corporation's information and reporting
systems. are in concept and design adequate to assure the board that appropriate
72
information will come to its attention in a timely manner." Allen's dictum
reflects a steady trend toward the recognition of duties of inquiry. Consider the
following examples.

(1) A longstanding doctrine of Anglo-American jurisprudence holds that

for some purposes "willful blindness" or "conscious avoidance' can be treated
73
as knowledge of the facts ignored. In recent decades, the federal courts have

invigorated this principle in criminal fraud prosecutions under a variety of
statutes.74 Where the defendants are lawyers or accountants, the cases suggest
that their failure to use modes of inquiry that are customary within the

profession can be taken as deliberate, and hence culpable, ignorance. Thus,
United States v. Benjamin,

sustained the conviction of an accountant for

As the Court tendentiously put it, "[A]bsent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the
71
directors to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they
have no reason to suspect exists." Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
72
In re Caremark Int'l, Inc., Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del- Ch. 1996).
See David Luban, ContrivedIgnorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957 (1999), which is useful both for
73
its survey of doctrine and its acute discussion of the moral blameworthiness of deliberate ignorance.
United States v. Cronin, 39 F.3d 1299, 1310 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Nicholson,
74
677 F.2d 706, 710 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1976). The cases
say that (1)subjective awareness of a high probability of illegal conduct [by an associate or agent],
and (2) purposeful contrivance to avoid learning of the illegal conduct, establish scienter. Nicholson,
677 F.2d at 710. This does not seem quite right. Subjective awareness alone amounts to knowledge if
the probability is high enough. What these cases imply is that proof of a lower probability is sufficient
where the defendant ignored customary or readily available means of inquiry.
A related line of authority in the securities field holds that "recklessness" can establish scienter
for civil liability purposes. See HAZEN, supra note 22, at 592-94.
Some statutes and cases impose liability on corporations and even their managers without
regard to knowledge. They are designed to induce monitoring, but unlike the "deliberate ignorance"
doctrine, they penalize ignorance without regard to its blameworthiness. Such practices seem dubious
in the criminal sphere, where blameworthy conduct and a culpable mental state traditionally have
been pre-requisites for liability. Some would suggest that even many of the "deliberate ignorance"
scenarios are inappropriate for criminal treatment. For a seminal discussion of these matters, see John
C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime
Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L.REV. 193 (1991). Itis no part of my argument todefend strict
liability for blameless ignorance, nor to defend any preference for criminal over civil sanctioning of
deliberate ignorance. My point is merely that deliberate ignorance is increasingly and appropriately
regarded as both blameworthy and a basis for some form of liability.
328 F.2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 1964).
75
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securities fraud despite his uncontradicted claim that he had merely incorporated
information provided by the client in the statements he prepared and had no
specific reason to know they were false. The court held that the accountant's
failure to adhere to verification
practices recognized within the profession
76
sufficed to establish scienter.
(2) Perhaps most influential have been the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
for corporate defendants enacted in 1991. These guidelines provide a
presumptive penalty for corporate criminal liability that may be several times
the amount of harm done by the violation. They then prescribe mitigating
factors which can reduce the presumptive penalty substantially,
including "an
' 77
effective program to prevent and detect violations of law.
(3) Delaware Supreme Court cases on director duty of care since the 1980s
have strengthened the duty of care significantly by emphasizing the board's
duty to demand and consider information in connection with major strategic
decisions. Cases like Smith v. Van Gorkom,7" suggest that the board deference
traditionally mandated by the "business judgment" rule is conditioned on the
board's adequately informing itself in connection with the decision at issue.
People sometimes now speak of a director's "duty to inform himself'79 as a
distinct element of the fiduciary duty of care.
(4) Several states have created "environmental audit" privileges which
immunize firms from liability for violations that the firms discover, promptly
report, and correct. The Environmental Protection Agency
has an announced
80
presumption against prosecution in such circumstances.
(5) In widely noted decisions applying the employment discrimination
provisions of the Civil Rights Act to sexual harassment, the Supreme Court
indicated that employer liability for harassing conduct by its agents would
depend in substantial part on the extent to which the employer had "exercised
reasonable care to avoid harassment and eliminate it where it might occur.'
The Court mentioned reporting and monitoring procedures as elements of such
care.
(6) Several statutes and regulations have required firms in various
industries to perform "risk analysis," requiring inquiry and explicit planning
with respect to various kinds of hazards."
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United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1964).
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U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8C2.5(f) (1998).

78
488 A.2d 858, 873-75 (Del. 1985).
79
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A-2d 858, 872 (Del.. 1985); see JEFFREY BAUMAN ET AL.,
CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 652 (5th ed. 2003).
80
See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 69, at 690 nn.7-8, 742-52.
81
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth,
524 US. 742, 764 (1998).
82
See Bao Q Tran & Jonathan P. Tomes, Risk Analysis: Your Key to Compliance, ACC
DOCKET, Nov. - Dec. 2003, at 38-54 (identifying about 25 laws requiring some form of "risk
analysis").
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B.

Duties of Clarity

Two types of doctrinal evolution have implicitly intensified the
responsibility of people for the foreseeable harm of ambiguity in statements or
conduct with which they are associated.
First, there is the law of fraud. There appears to have been a gradual
tendency in misrepresentation doctrine to shift responsibility for ambiguity
from the addressee, who bore it traditionally under notions such as caveat
emptor, to the speaker. The new position is set out in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which classifies as actionable misrepresentation, not onlyr
false statements, but ambiguous statements that are foreseeably misleading.
Under section 527, a statement susceptible to both a true interpretation and a
false interpretation is fraudulent if the speaker expects the addressee to
understand it in the false sense. Indeed, it is sufficient for liability that the
speaker shows "reckless indifference" as to how the addressee will understand
it. Thus, a used car dealer who describes a car as a "Rolls," knowing that is a
low-value Rolls Joyce but expecting the customer to understand that it is a
high value Rolls Royce, is liable. The Restatement also explicitly creates
liability for misleadingly incomplete statements (statements that are misleading
because of the failure "to state additional or qualifying matter") in section 529.
The second development that bears on ambiguity is the growth of the
secondary liability doctrines of aiding-and-abetting and conspiracy.84 These
doctrines are specifically addressed to conduct that, viewed in isolation, is
innocent or ambiguous, but seems wrongful when viewed in conjunction with
other activities. In a common scenario, a professional provides services-for
example, brokering or the preparation of financial statements-for a transaction
in which she knows that one party is making fraudulent representations to the
other. If her own conduct does not involve explicit misrepresentation but
knowingly assists the fraud of another, she is likely to be secondarily liable.
There has been a marked growth in this type of secondary liability in recent
decades.
C.

Sarbanes-Oxley

The most pervasive themes of the corporate control provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002-Congress's response to Enron and related
scandals-concern ignorance and ambiguity.

83
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 527, 529
standard is at least as broad. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN,
(3d ed. 2003).
84
See, e.g., United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620 (7th
802 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1986); Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788
177 P.2d 320 (Cal. App. 1947).

(1976). The securities law fraud
7 SECURITIES REGULATION 3419-27
Cir. 1998); United States v. Teitler,
(Or. 1999); Loser v. Superior Court,
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The Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934 were primarily
concerned with mandating disclosure by managers to investors. Key SarbanesOxley provisions are concerned with inducing disclosures within management.
The older provisions appear to have assumed that obligations of external
reporting would induce the firms to arrange adequate internal information flows.
Sarbanes-Oxley represents a recognition that strategies of deliberate ignorance
may impede effective information management.
The key provisions mandate "internal controls." The CEO and CFO are
required to sign annual reports and warrant that they are not misleading "based
on the officer's knowledge." The statute then proceeds to give these officers the
responsibility for designing "internal controls to ensure that material
information relating to the issuer.., is made known to such officers by others
within those entities." 85 As the Fried Frank firm puts it in a client memo, this
"makes it more difficult for [officers] to disclaim knowledge of their company's
disclosure. 8 6
This basic provision is supplemented by four others all designed to
induce corporate agents to provide information to senior managers. First, the
Act requires the audit committee to establish procedures for receiving and
responding to complaints, including confidential and87 anonymous ones from
employees, regarding auditing and accounting matters.
Second, there is the "up-the-ladder" reporting provision for lawyers.
Under this provision, a lawyer for an issuer who encounters evidence of a
securities law or fiduciary duty violation by an agent of the client must report it
to the chief executive officer or chief legal officer. If the officer in question fails to
"respond appropriately," the lawyer must report the evidence or violation to a
board committee comprised solely of independent directors."
Third, the statute obliges auditors to report to the audit committee "all
critical accounting policies and practices to be used," the possible alternatives,
and the ramifications of the different approaches. 9
Fourth, the auditors must involve the Audit Committee in decisions
about "critical accounting policies." They have to inform the Committee
where decisions among alternative treatments involve large stakes and of
communications from managers on these issues. °

85
15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2004). As Lawrence Cunningham points out, most of these provisions
are, in a strict legal sense, redundant of pre-existing law. Their primary effect is rhetorical and
hortatory, although as Cunningham also points out, that doesn't mean they won't have substantial
effect. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It
Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003).
86
Dixie L. Johnson & Karl Groskaufmanis, FFHSJClient Memorandum. The Post-Enron
Corporate Governance Environment: Where Are We Now?, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSTITUTE
HANDBOOK 2003, at 907, 923.
87
15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4) (2004).

88

§ 7245.

89

§ 78j-l(k).

90

§ 78j-1.
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The statute thus gives protections to the whistle-blowers, and it creates a
duty for the lawyers and accountants. Its main thrust, however, is to require the
board to encourage the communication of and to receive information it might
otherwise not want to be exposed to. Firms have always been fie to establish
whistle-blower policies and to demand reporting from their lawyers and
accountants. They have not consistently done so. Now they must.
Sarbanes-Oxley also includes a distinctive response to the problem of
calculated ambiguity. It requires the firm and its auditors to consider and
identify the limitations of their own disclosures. Annual reports must now
include an "internal control report" that assesses the "effectiveness of the
91
internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial reporting.
They are specifically to identify "all significant deficiencies in the design 92
or
operation of internal controls which could adversely affect" financial reporting.
These demands to explicitly identify ambiguities and weaknesses may
represent a new stage in the evolution of disclosure law, one that resonates with
the evolution of the modem business structure toward hyper-articulateness. To
some extent, they seem redundant. As the Restatement makes clear, the basic
fraud standard already required that ambiguities and weaknesses be identified
where there would otherwise be a strong risk of misunderstanding. But the new
standards seem more exigent in two ways. First, they appear to lower the
threshold at which explication is required. Ambiguities that might not have
amounted to a substantial risk of misunderstanding in the past may have to be
explicated. Second and most important, they seem designed to foster the kind
of continuous revision in disclosure practice that the new industrial
organization encourages in other matters. By forcing greater articulation of
premises, the new provisions facilitate comparison of practices across firms by
both investors and the firms themselves. By observing their peers, the firms can
get more insight into different disclosure possibilities and their effects.
V.

Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307 and the Bar's Resistance to Accountability

There are two competing intuitions as to how the trend toward
transparency in business organization might affect lawyers. On the one hand,
one might expect lawyers to adopt their clients' perspectives. Clearly, they
must take account of their clients' views to provide them satisfactory service,
and the natural tendency to identify with clients might encourage the absorption
of the clients' ideas and attitudes. Thus, one might expect those segments of
the bar that work for clients in the industries in which the new trends are most
developed to adapt their own firms to these trends.

91
92

§ 7262(a).
§ 7241(a)(5).
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On the other hand, lawyers have some. autonomy from their clients by
virtue of their independent organizational base and their expert knowledge of
technical matters. One might expect them to use this independence to resist the
trend toward transparency. Transparency measures are designed to enforce kinds
of accountability that can be threatening. Moreover, the bar has a traditional
ideological commitment, and perhaps an economic stake, in confidentiality
norms that are in tension with some transparency measures.
The intuition that ideology and/or self-interest might incline the bar to
resist the trend toward transparency receives support from the bar's reaction to
section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxlcy, which concerns the regulation of lawyers. This
section authorizes and instructs the SEC to promulgate regulations "setting
forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys" in federal
securities practice. These standards must include "up-the-ladder" reporting for
corporate counsel. Where attorneys encounter "evidence of a material violation
of the securities law or breach of fiduciary duty," they must report it to the CEO
or the general counsel. If the officer does not "appropriately respond," the
go to the audit committee or another committee of independent
attorney must
93
directors.
In November 2002, the SEC proposed rules implementing the "up-theladder" requirement and adding a requirement of "noisy withdrawal." The
latter would prescribe that, in situations where the board failed to respond
appropriately to an "up-the-ladder" report, the attorney must withdraw and give
94
notice to the SEC that she had withdrawn "for professional considerations.
The SEC subsequently withdrew the proposal that the attorney give notice to
revised
the SEC and proposed instead that the company give the notice. (The
95
proposal parallels the duties of a company when an auditor resigns.)
Section 307 has the information-forcing and articulation-forcing
characteristics that we have noted as central themes of Sarbanes-Oxley corporate
governance regulation. From the board's perspective, the main effect of "up-theladder" reporting is to force information on the directors that they always had a
right to demand but might have preferred not to receive. From the lawyer's
perspective, the main effect is to reduce the ambiguity about the relevant duties
that prior doctrine failed to resolve, and in fact, actively cultivated.
The bar's truculent response to the SEC's implementing efforts reflects its
longstanding resistance to outside regulation generally. It also shows a visceral
clinging to the prerogatives of ignorance and ambiguity. The corporate sector of
the profession seems unable to reconcile its own image and activities with the
principles that now undeniably govern its clients.

93
15 U.S.C. app. § 7245 (2004).
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Release Nos. 3394
8186, 34-47282 (proposed Jan. 29, 2003), available at http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8186.htm.
17 C.F.R. § 229.304 (2004).
95
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The issue of deliberate ignorance was implicitly at stake in the debate over
the cognitive threshold that would trigger duties to report "up-the-ladder". The

statute refers to "evidence" of a violation, which suggests something
considerably short of certainty that a violation is occurring. The SEC's initial
proposal triggered reporting duties when a lawyer "reasonably believe[d]" that a

violation had occurred, was occurring, or will occur;96 the final rule defines the
trigger as circumstances in which "it would be unreasonable... for a prudent
and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that" a
violation has occurred, is occurring, or will occur.9 7 Both phrases are

imprecise, and the latter is an affront to English style, but the general thrust of
both seems recognizable. Each suggests an "objective" standard under which
unless he had made the
lack of knowledge would not exonerate the lawyer
9
8
inquiries that a reasonable lawyer would undertake.
Many segments of the bar, however, protested strenuously against any
"objective standard." In particular, they urged the SEC to adopt the standard

of

the

Model

Rules

of Professional

Conduct

provisions

regarding

made
The Model Rules forbid misrepresentations
misrepresentation.
"knowingly", and they define "know" to mean "actual knowledge"-a

subjective standard that seems to deny any duty to inquire.9 9 Lawyers pressed
the SEC to incorporate this standard arguing, first, that it would promote
desirable uniformity with state standards, and second, that it would spare

lawyers the difficulties of having to determine the meaning in particular
situations of an objective standard."'
These were arguments of desperation. An objective cognitive standard

resembling both the proposed and final one already governed some professional
duties under the Model Rules, and it defined the lawyer's duty of care to clients

under the common law duty of care.'

01

Organizational clients are subject to

96
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670
(proposed Dec. 2, 2002).
97
17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (2004).
See Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103
98
COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1274-76 (2003). While her frustration at the contorted language is
understandable, I think Susan Koniak is wrong to predict that the standard will be interpreted as closer
to a subjective one.
99
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 3.3(a), 1.0(f) (2003). Koniak argues that the
'actual knowledge" standard reflects that, "[i]n the bar's normative universe, lawyers never know."
Koniak, supra note 98, at 1247.
See, e.g., Comments of Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President, American Bar Association to
100
the SEC (Dec. 18, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Carlton].
101
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(j) ("Reasonably should know" when used in
reference to a lawyer denotes that "a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would
ascertain the matter in question."); R. 2.3(a) (defining duty to explain to client that lawyer represents
another entity when lawyer "reasonably should know" client interests are adverse to entity); R. 2.4(b)
(defining duty of lawyer serving as third-party neutral to explain lawyer's role when lawyer
"reasonably should know" that a party does not understand his role); R. 3.6(a) (defining duties with
respect to trial statements that lawyer "reasonably should know" will be disseminated publicly); R.
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standards of reasonable knowledge (and hence inquiry) under the negligence
norms of myriad regulatory regimes. Lawyers routinely advise clients on the
application of such standards. If taken seriously, the lawyers' professed inability
to apply such standards to their own conduct would be a confession of
astonishing incompetence. In fact, however, it was a plea to retain the
privileges of deliberate ignorance as a defense against accountability.
Calculated ambiguity was a tacit theme in the bar's push to limit the
intrusion of the SEC rules on state disciplinary rules. The bar had long
opposed SEC regulation of lawyers on the ground that it would displace the
traditional regulatory authority of the states. Once section 307 was enacted, it
had to live with federally-mandated "up-the-ladder" reporting, since the statute
was specific on that point. But it vehemently opposed "noisy withdrawal,"
arguing that Congress could not have intended such an extensive abrogation of
deference to state lawyer regulation.' 03 The extent to which the tradition of state
lawyer regulation is entitled to respect in any circumstances is open to debate.
Arguably, the state processes have been dominated by lawyers acting from
narrowly selfish motives. Even if we assume they have some general
legitimacy, it would be extremely implausible for the SEC to defer to them in a
matter it deemed integral to the securities laws. The securities laws are plainly
intended to create a national system with a federally-defined floor of practice
standards that are uniform across states.
But for our purposes, the key point is to recognize the connection between
the appeal to state regulation and the preference for ambiguity. One source of
ambiguity is the choice-of-law issue involved in state regulation of multi-state
transactions. The ABA codes had no choice-of-law rule until 1993. ° The new
rule, which looks in most non-litigation situations to the rules of the state that
has licensed the lawyer, is controversial and has not been universally
adopted. 10 5 Even where it is adopted and settles tie issue for individual
lawyers, it leaves potential problems of predictability and coordination when
lawyers from more than one state collaborate, as commonly occurs in securities
matters. 106

4.4b (defining duty to notify sender when lawyer receives a document that lawyer "reasonably should
know" was sent inadvertently).
102
See Koniak, supra note 95, at 1248-60.
103
See, e.g., Carlton, supra note 97; Comments of Professor Joseph Grundfest and various
Silicon Valley lawyers to the SEC (Dec. 23, 2002) (on file with author).
104
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b). See ABA Committee Report Explaining
the 1993 Amendment to Rule 8.5, reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY SIMON, REGULATION OF
LAWYERS 433 (2004).
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See ABA Committee Report Explaining the 1993 Amendment to Rule 8.5, reprintedin

STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 434-38 (2004).

106
For example, with respect to disclosure of confidential information to rectify client
fraud, some states forbid, some permit, and some require disclosure, See American Bar Ass'n, Chart
of Ethics Rules on Client Confidences, at cols. E-G, reprinted in THOMAS MORGAN & RONALD
ROTUNDA, 2003 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 163 -66.

Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity

Much more fundamental, however, is the fact that ambiguity was the
dominant characteristic of the ABA's rule on corporate representation and the
variations adopted by most states until the threat of Sarbanes-Oxley preemption forced some clarification in 2003. Before then, the rule gave no
guidance as to when the lawyer should go to the board, and was unclear as to
whether she was ever allowed to go beyond it. And while the rule has clearly
never required "noisy withdrawal," it remains unclear whether it permits it. To
prefer the state regime is to treat ambiguity as a virtue.
The bar failed in its efforts on behalf of an objective standard and strong
deference to state rules (although it has so far fended off the strongest of the
proposed departures from state norms: mandatory "noisy withdrawal").
However, one provision of the SEC's final rule under section 307 does seem
unfortunately responsive to the bar's pleas. In general, when a board reports
evidence of illegal conduct to the CEO or chief legal officer, she must determine
that their response is "appropriate."
This would be satisfied where the
response gave the lawyer reason to believe either that there had been no
misconduct or that effective remedial steps have been taken. Otherwise, she
must proceed to the board or a committee of independent directors. However,
the final rule creates an exception. The lawyer need not proceed further if, after
reporting to the CEO or general counsel, she is informed that the board
approved retention of another lawyer to look into the matter. The other lawyer
has determined that he can ethically "assert a colorable defense on behalf of the
issuer ... in any investigation or judicial or administrative proceeding relating
to the reported evidence of a material violation."'0 7
Although it remains to be seen what the influence of this provision will
be, it seems unfortunately conducive to pathologies of deliberate ignorance and
calculated ambiguity. The effect of the provision is to authorize two types of
ignorance. When the second lawyer gives the requisite opinion, the first lawyer
is excused from going to the board. So the board does not have to be
confronted with the first lawyer's information. (This effect is mitigated by the
requirement that the board itself have approved retaining the second lawyer, but
that fact questions the point of excusing the first lawyer's report.)
Moreover, it appears that the first lawyer has no duty to assess the
qualifications of the second lawyer or the quality of his investigation. In the
normal duty-of-care situation, a lawyer would not be justified in relying on a
second lawyer's opinion about what should be done without plausibly
determining that the opinion was well supported (and even if it were, the
lawyer would often have a responsibility to make an independent assessment of
the merits)." 8 Without such a responsibility on the part of the first lawyer,

107
17 C.F.R. §§ 205-2(b)(3)(ii), 205.3(b)(8) (2004)108
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.2 (providing that a subordinate
lawyer is justified in relying on the direction of a supervisor with respect to a question of professional
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there is no check on the ability of a board to shop for a compliant second
lawyer, even one who might act in bad faith.
And the "second opinion" exception contains a salient ambiguity. The
"colorable issue" language and the reference to proceedings suggests that
threshold of plausibility required for counsel to present a claim to a tribunal.
This standard requires only that the claim be more than "frivolous.""1

9

Since

this standard regulates positions that the client will take publicly, the only
concern competing with the client's interests is the danger of wasting the
tribunal's time. However, it would trivialize the "up-the-ladder" rule to apply
this standard to situations where no proceeding was pending. Whether the
matter becomes public may depend on what the attorneys do under the rule.
The fact that some lawyer has been found who thinks the client has a nonfrivolous defense to claims of wrongdoing is of small moment if the effect of the
judgment is that the client's conduct will remain unknown and the claim will
never be made.
While it is possible that the SEC meant the rule to apply only where
public claims have been made or are about to be made, the rule is phrased
much more broadly. It is also possible that the SEC intended to create a
transparently low standard and just drafted it badly."° But so far, the eftect of
the SEC's efforts has been to preserve a substantial measure of space for the
kind of ignorance and ambiguity in which the bar has traditionally taken refuge
from pressures of accountability.
VI. Conclusion
Deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity are key themes in major
scandals from Watergate to Enron. In such scandals, participants avoid liability
by "tip-toeing" around suspect activity. They steer clear of "dangerous"
information and communicate ambiguously in order to avoid implicating
themselves in any organizational wrongdoing. Until recently, these practices
were encouraged by both organizational structure and legal doctrine. Recent
trends in both organization and law have narrowed the space for them by
increasing duties of inquiry and articulation. Despite these trends, the bar
continues to support rules of conduct that leave room for deliberate ignorance
and calculated ambiguity.

responsibility only if the direction represents "a reasonable resolution of an arguable question of
professional duty").
109
MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3.
110
Koniak believes that the rule was intended to be applied broadly as a concession to the
bar. See Koniak, supra note 95, 1275-78. The attempt to import the "colorable defense" standard to
the sphere of disclosure regulation was a major (and highly dubious) tactic of the defenders of the
Kaye Scholer firm against the misconduct charges arising out of its representation of Charles Keating
and Lincoln Savings and Loan. See William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of
Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243, 270-73
(1998).
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The collapse of Enron is a watershed moment in this evolution. Although
it advertised itself as a highly advanced business organization, Enron more
accurately resembled the ambivalent bureaucracy organization of the midtwentieth century. Enron, like other ambivalent bureaucracies, relied heavily on
hierarchical relationships, managerial loyalty, and formality. As a result,
employees were motivated to travel down a path of ignorance and ambiguity,
avoiding personal liability on the one hand, and pleasing management on the
other. The legal community has historically embraced this path of deliberate
ignorance and calculated ambiguity as well.
Recent developments have undercut the attractiveness of deliberate
ignorance and calculated ambiguity. Modem pressures of market competition
have forced companies to adopt more flexible organizational characteristics that
empower individuals and provide multiple reporting lines. As a result, personal
relations of deference and loyalties independent of the firm's goals are more
difficult to maintain. These characteristics pressure employees toward
articulation and inquiry. In some ways, the legal community's response
parallels the business organization's trend toward duties of inquiry and
articulation. Federal courts have encouraged duties of inquiry and articulation
by imposing criminal liability in situations of "conscious avoidance."
Congress's Sarbanes-Oxley Act concerns ignorance and ambiguity. The inquiry
and articulation forcing features of Sarbanes-Oxley, while simply an
intensification of prior trends, appropriately increase legal pressures for
organizations to move toward the newer model.
It remains to be seen, however, how significantly these pressures will
affect lawyers. The bar continues to resist some responsibilities of the sort that
are being imposed on its clients. The bar actively opposed SEC rules on the
regulation of lawyers that attempted to decrease the room for ignorance and
ambivalence. While the bar has generally resisted outside regulation, its
opposition to many of the lawyer regulation initiatives under Sarbanes-Oxley
reflects a misguided attachment to the privileges of non-accountability
associated with deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity. To restore
integrity to the profession, it must break this attachment.

